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It is apparent that not only are there high levels of inequalities within most countries, but 
those inequalities have been growing over time.  They are much larger today that they were 
a third of a century ago.  It is also clear that there is far from equal opportunity:  the life 
prospects of children of rich and well-educated parents are far better than those with poor 
and less well-educated parents.  Indeed, in the US, it appears that the prospects of a child 
from an underprivileged family that does well in school are poorer than that of a child from 
a well-off family that does not perform well in school.  At one time, economists and other 
social scientists tried to justify these inequities through the marginal productivity theory, 
which says that individuals’ incomes correspond to their social contributions to society.  
Even a cursory look at the data shows that none of the individuals who have made the 
greatest contributions to our society, say through the inventions of the laser or the 
transistor or the discovery of DNA, are among the richest.  And among the richest are many 
who got their money from the exploitation of market power and/or political connections.   
In this essay, I discuss the dynamics of social inequalities at three levels—the global macro, 
at the forces shaping the dynamics of the distribution of income across countries; the 
country-macro, at the forces shaping the dynamics of the distribution of income within a 
country; and at the micro—the forces shaping the dynamics of individuals’ opportunities.  
The central thesis of this short paper is that to understand the dynamics of social inequality 
at any of these levels, though the competitive model may provide a useful benchmark, it is 
departures from that benchmark that are really driving the changes in inequalities today.   
	
I. THE DATA 
The US has the best data, and the worst inequality, so I illustrate the basic issues by looking 
at what is happening there.  Figure 1a shows that the average income, adjusted for inflation, 
of the bottom 90% has been essentially stagnant for the past 42 years.  At the same time, the 
average income of the 1% has multiplied 4.3 times.  This pattern is seen in most other 
countries—though the US stands out.  France, the Netherlands and Sweden are three 
countries where the increase in their share has been nonexistent or more limited.  The UK, 
which in many respects has followed the US model, has an increased share almost as large 















Median income in the US has been stagnant for the past quarter century (see Figure 2a).  
But more striking—and reflected in American politics—is that median income of a full time 
male work is the same level that it was more than four decades ago (see Figure 2b).  And it is 
increasingly difficult for these workers in the middle to get full time jobs—so if we looked at 
median income of a male worker, things would be even worse.  Unfortunately, the standard 
source of European data, Eurostat, doesn’t have data going back that far.  Not surprisingly, 






















Worse is what has happened in the US to those at the bottom, where the real wage is at the 
level it was sixty years ago (see Figure 3a).  In this arena, things are unambiguously better 









In most of the advanced countries, there are three major changes to the income 
distribution:  more of the income is going to the top, more people are in poverty, and there 
has been an evisceration of the middle class—the median income has been stagnating, and 
the fraction of individuals around the median, say with an income of .5 to 1.5 times the 
median, is decreasing.  More individuals are in the tails of the distribution.   
We typically summarize the distribution of income in a measure called the Gini coefficient, 
and in most countries that has been increasing.  (see Figure 4). There are, however, a few 
countries that have resisted this trend, such as France and Norway; and a few, mostly in 











There is an important lesson from this—the economic forces at play in all of the advanced 
countries are similar, but the outcomes are markedly different.  The explanation of the 
difference is that different countries have pursued different policies.  In short, inequality is 
a choice.  Had countries pursued different policies, there would have been different results.  
Those countries that followed the Anglo-American model have wound up with more 
inequality.   
Before turning to the other dimensions of inequality, I want to emphasize that those 
countries that have chosen to have more inequality have not had better overall economic 
performance.  I emphasized in my book The Price of Inequality that society pays a high 
price for inequality, including poorer economic performance.2  Empirical research at the 
IMF has provided substantial statistical support for the theoretical ideas that I had put 
forward3. 
																																								 																				
2 The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2012.(published in Italian by in Italian by Einaudi). A short summary is available in a paper 
by the same title  in Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable Nature: Our Responsibility, P.S. Dasgupta, 
V. Ramanathan, M. Sanchez Sorondo (eds.), Vatican City: The Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 2015, 
pp.379-399. 
3 Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charalambos G. Tsangarides, “Redistribution, Inequality, 




Income is only one dimension of inequality.  There are several areas that are very 
important, but which are hard to quantify, including access to justice.  The discriminatory 
nature of the mass incarceration in the US, though, shows that the issue is deep.4  So too, 
during the Great Recession, many ordinary Americans were thrown out of their homes—
even when they owed no money—on the basis of a mere false claim by a financial 
institution.  This illustrated the lack of access of justice for large numbers of Americans.5 
Another dimension that is hard to quantify is inequality in voice—in effective participation 
in the political process.  When I was chief economist of the World Bank we surveyed 10,000 
poor people about what aspects of their life were of most concern.  Obviously, the lack of 
income was key.  But there were two others:  insecurity and the lack of voice, the fact that so 
much of what happened to them was beyond their control.   
 
There are, however, two other dimensions that are easy to measure.  One is the inequality 
in health—differences in life expectancy.  Nature itself leads some individuals to live longer 
than others.  But if some individuals do not have access to health care or cannot get 
adequate nutrition, then there will be even greater inequities in health.  Not surprisingly, 
the US has large disparities, because it is the one advanced country that does not recognize 
that access to healthcare is a basic right6.  Figure 5 shows dramatically the consequence—
those at the bottom, those with a high school education (or less) have seen an increase in 
their mortality, at the same time that elsewhere in the world mortality is decreasing.  Of 
most concern is that one of the major sources of morbidity are “social diseases,” 




4 See, for instance, Oliver Roeder, Lauren-Brooke Eisen and Julia Bowling, “What Caused The 
Crime Decline?”, Brennan Center for Justice Paper, 2015; Michelle Alexander and Cornel West, 
The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, New York: The New Press, 
2012. 
5 See J. E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, New 
York: WW Norton, 2010. 
6 See Anne Case and Angus Deaton, “Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among white non-
Hispanic Americans in the 21st century,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1-6, 
2015; Anne Case and Angus Deaton, “Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century”, Brookings 









The magnitude of these adverse effects is so large that, by 2015, they had overwhelmed 
other factors contributing to increasing life expectancy, and life expectancy for Americans 
as a whole have decreased7.   
The other very important dimension of inequality—related to the main theme of this talk, 
the dynamics of inequalities—is equality of opportunity.  Countries differ markedly with 
regards to opportunity.  Figure 6 shows the relationship between equality of opportunity 
and equality:  countries with more inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) have 
less mobility across generations.  Countries with the least opportunity include US, UK, and 
Italy; while those with the best are the Scandinavian countries and Canada, sometimes 
referred to as the Scandinavia of North America.    
																																								 																				










II. BASIC ANALYTICS 
The income of a household consists of income from labor and income from assets that the 
individual owns other than human capital.  Thus, income inequality is related to disparity 
in the ownership of these assets and the returns to different factors.  The dynamics of 
inequality is related to the dynamics of asset ownership.  If the wealthier transfer a large 
fraction of their wealth to their children, there will be an intertemporal transfer of 
advantage.  At the same time, in a period of growth, families divide their wealth among their 
children, and this “division” can lead to a process of regression towards the mean.   
The mathematics of this process, which I developed in my Ph.D. thesis some time ago, 
enables us to show that typically, there is an equilibrium income and wealth distribution, 
the result of a balance between centrifugal forces pulling the economy apart and centripetal 




of changes in these forces, leading to a new balance.  For instance, with less progressive 
taxation, and especially with lower estate taxes, the wealthier can pass on more to their 
children.  This results in an equilibrium with more inequality.  With better public 
education, all young people get a more similar endowment of human capital, and that helps 
pull the economy together.  The resulting equilibrium distributions entail less inequality.  
With greater diversity in the population, differences in the number of children, larger 
differences in the returns to capital, etc., the centrifugal forces creating more inequality 
will be greater.   
By the same token, if capital is more unequally distributed than labor (as it is) an increase 
in the returns to capital relative to labor will (for any given distributions of labor and 
capital) lead to more inequality. 
	
Piketty’s model 
Piketty’s analysis8 is, in fact, a special case of my model.  He points out that if the rate of 
return to capital is greater than the rate of growth, and if capitalists save all of their income, 
then the wealth of the capitalists will grow faster than the economy—and if the return to 
capital does not fall, then there will be increasing wealth and income concentration. 
But there are several critical assumptions.  Those at the top, while they save more than 
poorer individuals, have a savings rate that is far less than one.  What matters is the 
relationship between sr (where s is the savings rate and r is the return to capital) and g, the 
rate of growth.  For plausible numbers, sr < g, i.e. the capitalists would get a declining share 
of capital. 
Moreover, if capital were increasing as rapidly as predicted by Piketty’s model, the return 
to capital should have declined—the principle of diminishing returns is one of the most 
important principles in economics. Eventually, the return would come down to the level of 
g—in which case the share of capital would not be increasing. 
The fundamental problem with the model is posed when looking at national income data—
one would have predicted a decline in the capital income ratio, while Piketty shows that 
																																								 																				
8 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 




there has been an increase in the wealth income ratio.  The reason is simple:  large fractions 
of wealth are not capital—wealth includes the capitalized value of rents, including land, 
monopoly, and intellectual property rents.  Wealth can be increasing but capital 
decreasing.  This distinction is going to be critical in the discussion below:  a major source 
of the growth in inequality is an increase in the share of wealth that is associated with rents.  
If, as I suggest below, there are reasons for an increase in rents, and those rents go 
disproportionately to the wealthy, then there will be an increase in inequality; and if there 
is also less capital, wages may go down, and again inequality will increase.   
	
Summary of key determinants of inequality in the model 
We can divide the analysis of inequality into the determinants of the distribution of the 
ownership of assets and the determinants of returns to assets.  The analysis above 
emphasized that the dynamics of distribution of asset ownership is driven by the 
intergenerational transfer of wealth, human advantage, and other advantages and 
disadvantages.  Of special concern is education.  As we noted, strong public education 
systems enable all children, regardless of the income of their parents, get the amount of 
human capital that is related to their abilities.  (Indeed, strong public education which 
invests more in those children who have lower ability endowments, can reduce the level of 
inequality from what it otherwise would be.)   
	
III.  DYNAMICS OF INEQUALITIES WITHIN A COUNTRY  
The model I just described provides a framework for understanding the dynamics of 
inequality. The changes in the dynamics of inequality can be simply described in terms of 
changes in the underlying centripetal and centrifugal forces determining the income and 
wealth distribution.  In the United States, the education system is local, and with increasing 
geographical economic segregation, there is increasing inequality in educational 
opportunity. (Studies also show the high correlation between educational opportunity and 
income.)9  The reduction in progressivity of the income tax system (indeed, now it is 
regressive) also increases the inequality of income and wealth.   
																																								 																				
9 Other relevant factors include the extent of asseortive mating.  Again, in the US, with its education 




A reduction in savings rate reduces inequality; a reduction in family size (on average) 
increases inequality.   
An increase in dispersion in any of the relevant variables—including the returns to labor or 
capital—increases the level of inequality.  There are some who have argued that 
technological change is skilled biased, increasing the education premium, and thus the 
dispersion of wages. 
 
Beyond the Competitive Model 
All of this analysis has been conducted with the framework of the competitive model.  But 
there are multiple reasons to believe that that model provides an inadequate description of 
the economy.  I already referred to the evidence concerning the increasing importance of 
rents, including monopoly rents, consistent with evidence of increasing concentration in 
many industries10.  Weakening of anti-trust enforcement and changes in technology11 as 
well as changes in the structure of the economy, towards sectors which are naturally less 
competitive, all may have contributed to an increase in the average “market power” with in 
the economy. 
Other forces too have led to increased income at the top:  changes in corporate governance 
have allowed executives to take away an increasing share of corporate income.  Increased 
financialization of the economy, combined with weaker corporate governance and what I 
have described as heightened levels of moral turpitude have resulted in those in the 
financial sector exploiting the rest of the economy. 
Similarly, weakening of workers’ bargaining power, both the result of weaker unions, 
changes in legal frameworks, and globalization have lowered the income of ordinary 
workers.   
																																								 																				
10 See Jason Furman and Peter Orszag, “A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in 
Inequality,” Presentation at “A Just Society” Centennial Event in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, 
Columbia University, 2015. Retrieved from: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151016_firm_level_perspe
ctive_on_role_of_rents_in_inequality.pdf. 
11 An increase in fixed costs (e.g. associated with research) or in network externalities.  See, e.g. 
chapters 5 and 6 of J. E. Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach 
to Growth, Development, and Social Progress,  New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. 




More generally, the rules of the game have been changed to advantage those at the top and 
to disadvantage those below, increasing inequality.  Markets don’t exist in a vacuum.  We 
have to structure them.  For the past third of a century the rules of the game have been 
rewritten in ways that increase inequality and simultaneously weaken the economy, for 
instance, by increasing short-termism.12   
The effect of all of this is that a huge gap has opened up between productivity growth and 
compensation growth (leading to a marked decrease in the share of labor).  Figure 7a shows 
that before the mid-70s, the two moved together.  This was the pattern that had been 
observed over a large number of countries and sectors for long periods of time.  It was 
viewed almost as a “law” in economics.  But then, suddenly, matters changed.  There was no 
huge change in technology or in the quality of the labor force.  There were rapid changes in 




12 Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy, with Nell Abernathy, Adam Hersh, Susan Holmberg and 
Mike Konczal, A Roosevelt Institute Book, New York: W.W. Norton, 2015. There is a forthcoming version 




While we don’t have easily accessible data for Europe going back in time, the same disparity 





One particularly invidious manifestation of “power” is discrimination, evidence of which is 
pervasive.  Women and minorities get paid significantly less than those with comparable 
skills who are white men.  Discrimination in America is more subtle than it was in the days 
of Jim Crow (except in areas like the criminal justice system, with its mass incarceration), 
but is nonetheless real.  Economic theory (in particular, game theory) has shown how such 
discriminatory equilibria can persist (contrary to the assertions of Chicago economists like 
Gary Becker).13  What is surprising is that while overt racial and gender discrimination has 
been reduced, the wage gaps persist.   
																																								 																				
13 See, for instance, Dasgupta, Partha, 2005, “The Economics of Social Capital”, Economic Record, 
Vol. 81, Issue Supplement S1, pp. S2-S21; and Dasgupta, Partha, 2012, “Dark Matters: Exploitation 





IV. INEQUALITIES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
In recent years, with the growth of the emerging markets, some of the inequalities across 
countries have been reduced; yet the inequalities between the poorest countries and the 
rest persist.  The rules of globalization have much to do with both.  Globalization, in the 
form of export-led growth, was essential to the success of the East Asian countries.  But the 
rules of globalization are designed to keep the poorest countries producing raw materials.  
The agricultural subsidies in advanced countries reduce prices of agricultural commodities, 
and while they improve the well-being of a few thousand rich Western farmers and 
agricultural corporations, they move millions of those in Africa and India into deeper 
poverty.  Trade agreements have kept generic drugs off the market, reducing access to life 
saving medicines across the developing world.   
For years, the Washington Consensus policies, particularly the structural adjustment 
policies, imposed on Africa and other poor countries by the World Bank and the IMF as a 
condition for their assistance, impoverished these countries.14  These policies led to a 
quarter century of stagnation and the deindustrialization of these countries.  Fortunately, 
there have in recent years been major reforms, which have reduced the extent to which 
these oppressive policies have been imposed.   
There are other forces reinforcing these trends.  Climate change, in particular, has had its 
most devastating effects on poor countries, and on the poorest people in those countries.   
	
V. REMEDIES 
The policies to “undo” the adverse dynamics of inequality follow much from the analysis of 
the source.  We need to rewrite the rules of the market economy, once again, doing a better 
job in curbing market power, exclusion, and discrimination; ensuring that there is less 
intergenerational transmission of advantage—including less intergenerational 
transmission of human and financial capital—in part by improving public education 
(including pre-school and access to tertiary education), introducing stronger inheritance 
taxes and more progressive income taxes.   
																																								 																				




Some of the observed inequality in today’s society arises from those whose human capital 
and undiversified financial capital has been hit by a shock, that is, who have been living in 
places and working in jobs in industries where there has been a marked decrease in 
demand—as steelworkers in the Midwest lose the jobs, they also see the value of their main 
asset, their home, plummet.  There is no insurance provided by the market against these 
risks.  There is a need for social protection—to help these individuals move to other places 
and to other jobs; and to help them manage with the lower incomes they are likely to have 
whether they get a job or not.  Over the past century, systems of social protection (e.g. for 
aging and for health care) have improved enormously, even withstanding, in most places, 
the attacks that have been leveled against them in some places.  Though we have 
unemployment insurance systems designed to address temporary unemployment, we do 
not really have a system of social protection adequate to respond to the rapid dynamics that 
mark the 21st century economy.   
It is no accident that we have the system we have, with the rules that it has.  Special 
interests like it that way.  I may have exaggerated a bit when I said the US had a government 
of the one per cent, for the one percent, and by the one percent, or when I suggested that we 
had moved from a democracy with one person one vote to one with one dollar one vote.  But 
It is clear that some of the policies that have been pursued have been strongly 
disadvantageous to the economy as a whole and simultaneously have created more 
inequality:  there have been only a few winners.  In other cases, there may be slight 
increases in national income, but these are overwhelmed by the distributive effect, raising 
questions about the desirability of the policy—at least in the absence of adequate systems of 
social protection.   
Globalization illustrates.  The overall gains to the economy have been exaggerated.  The last 
trade agreement (rejected by President Trump), the Transpacific Partnership, TPP, 
heralded as the largest trade agreement ever, was nonetheless estimated by the 
government to have a net effect on GDP after it was fully implemented of .15%; other 
studies suggested that that was an exaggeration, and the impacts on GDP were smaller.  Yet, 
it reduced access to generic medicines, had provisions which threatened regulations to 
protect health, the environment, safety, working conditions, and even economic stability, 




generally, trade agreements have weakened the bargaining power of workers.  Even in 
standard competitive models, opening up of trade reduces wages of unskilled workers, but 
in more realistic models where firms have market power, the effects are even greater.   
The economic and political dynamics of the system work in ways to perpetuate and 
increase this inequality—unless something intervenes.  Economic inequality gives rise to 
political inequality, especially so in political systems, like the US, where money matters.  
Political inequality is then used to rewrite the rules in ways which gives rise to more 
economic inequality, in a vicious circle.  There is momentum to these adverse dynamics—
unless something happens to reverse these trends.   
If change to these disturbing dynamics comes, it will come through our political system, but 
I suspect only after there is greater awareness of what has been happening, an awareness 
that the extremes of inequality are neither economically nor morally justifiable.  The 
Church should be the defender of the poor and the voiceless.  It will be important for its 
voice now be heard, as clearly and forcefully as it made its voice heard in the protection of 
our environment for the benefit of future generations.   
